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BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY. By Timothy J. O'Neill Mid-
dletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 1985. Pp. xviii, 325. 
$27.95. 
The success of a democratic society depends, in large part, on the 
political education of its citizens. In Bakke & the Politics of Equality, 
Timothy O'Neill1 examines the role of the judicial process in political 
education. In particular, the book seeks to evaluate the effectiveness 
of participation in the amicus curiae process as a means of political 
education. Through a series of interviews and surveys of members of 
the 117 organizations that submitted briefs in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 2 O'Neill attempts to discover whether the pro-
cess of preparing and submitting amicus briefs serves to educate or-
ganization members about the issues involved. 
With this as his goal, O'Neill proceeds to claim a greater signifi-
cance for his work: 
If Bakke did teach and the members of amici organizations did learn, 
then litigation can help the nation learn to identify and assess problems 
of public policy and to choose from among alternatives. If Bakke did 
not teach about the issue of equality, claims that the courts are "teachers 
in a vital seminar" must be viewed skeptically. [p. 6] 
In spite of this obviously debatable suggestion that the failure of the 
amicus process to serve as an effective educational tool casts serious 
doubt on the entire educative function of the courts, O'Neill himself 
admits that ''Bakke provoked a national debate over the legal, social, 
and ethical justifications for preferential treatment of racially disad-
vantaged groups" (p. 6). And, in the preceding paragraph, he points 
out that his book emphasizes "not what the arguments [in the briefs] 
taught the courts or what the courts taught the nation, but the learn-
ing process within litigating organizations" (p. 6; emphasis in original). 
O'Neill's failure to identify clearly the hypotheses he purports to test 
clouds his analysis, leaving the reader uncertain of the book's 
objectives. 
Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether we should 
be surprised or dismayed if we learn that the amicus process is not the 
most effective means to educate citizens politically, the discussion in 
the book goes far beyond this limited inquiry to address broader 
problems of group organizational behavior. O'Neill presents three 
rather vague hypotheses, which he apparently intends to test in his 
study of the amici organizations: (1) "The more 'business-like' an or-
ganization is, the less 'school-like' it will be"; (2) " 'Good faith' con-
1. Timothy J. O'Neill, a graduate of Claremont Men's College (B.A. 1971) and of the Uni· 
versity of California at Berkeley (M.A. 1974; Ph.D. 1981), is presently Assistant Professor of 
Political Science at Wellesley College. 
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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fiict encourages education"; and (3) "Democracy need not be 
sacrificed in order for an organization to teach and to be effective" (pp. 
11-17). The broader implications of these hypotheses indicate that 
O'Neill is interested not only in examining the effectiveness of the ami-
cus process as a tool for political education, but also in using his study 
of the amicus organizations in Bakke to test his hypotheses on organi-
zational behavior. O'Neill never clearly articulates the goal of the 
book, however, nor does he ever rigorously pursue any particular line 
of analysis. Thus, the work suffers from a lack of purpose throughout. 
To aid in his analysis of the 117 amici organizations, O'Neill at-
tempts to categorize neatly these very diverse organizations. 3 He cre-
ates some fourteen different categories, including three subcategories 
of "interest orientation," three of "scope," two of "leadership style," 
three of "polarization," and three of "decision-making behavior." An 
organization must satisfy a number of criteria or "indicators" before 
being placed in a particular category. O'Neill assures the reader of the 
certainty of his method by pointing out that twenty-five of his stu-
dents, who were given an explanation of the criteria for assigning orga-
nizations to categories and the empirical data on a random sample of 
thirty-five organizations, reached almost the same results in categori-
zation as O'Neill (pp. xvi-xvii). The important question, however, is 
not whether these students, given the categories and criteria for assign-
ment, were able to fit square pegs into square holes, but whether the 
categories and the empirical data themselves serve any useful purpose 
in O'Neill's analysis. The failure of the book to arrive at any signifi-
cant conclusions suggests that they do not. 
O'Neill acknowledges the difficulties in relying upon people's own 
perceptions of their learning as a measurement of the actual extent of 
their political education (p. 17). Perhaps one of the most significant 
weaknesses of this book is O'Neill's failure to come to terms with these 
problems. He states that "[t]he human response may be a misleading 
one, but it is a plausible place to begin. If the response is corroborated 
by more observable evidence, its credibility can be established" (p. 17). 
The lack of any observable corroborating evidence prevents O'Neill 
from drawing any meaningful conclusions from his study. 
Having vaguely established his thesis in the introduction, O'Neill 
begins the first chapter with an unnecessarily long elaboration of the 
background of Bakke's dispute with the University of California at 
Davis, its progression through the courts, and several relevant cases 
prior to Bakke (pp. 20-45). The chapter also includes a short essay on 
theories of equality (pp. 49-56). Because O'Neill asked the members 
of the amici organizations only whether they learned about the issues 
involved, rather than what they learned, this chapter is entirely 
superfluous. 
3. See the appendix on methodology, pp. 263-66. 
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In the second chapter, O'Neill tests the validity of his first hypoth-
esis - that "the more 'business-like' an organization is, the less 
'school-like' it will be." He divides the amici organizations into two 
sets of categories - organizational purpose (interest groups, minority-
defense organizations, or public-interest advocates) and scope (broad, 
medium, or narrow range of arguments or facts presented to the or-
ganization's members) - and proceeds to discuss, one by one, the 
characteristics of various groups in each category and the nature of 
their participation in Bakke. O'Neill apparently considers an organi-
zation to be "business-like" when its purpose is to defend specific in-
terests of its members (interest groups) and not "business-like" when 
its purpose is to promote interests not directly benefiting its members 
(public-interest advocates). Minority-defense organizations, accord-
ing to O'Neill's scheme, fall somewhere in between (p. 62). O'Neill 
argues, then, that if his first hypothesis is correct, "it is reasonable to 
presume that organizational purpose would determine the breadth and 
diversity (scope) of the organizational debate over Bakke" (p. 62). He 
finds, however, that no such correlation exists (p. 63). O'Neill tries to 
explain away this failure of his scheme of categories to produce ex-
pected results by concluding that "survival needs" of many organiza-
tions took precedence over the goals that the organizations were 
formed to achieve (p. 63). He briefly considers and then rejects the 
possibility that his categories may be inadequate: "It is possible to 
expand the meaning of organizational 'purpose' to include these extra-
and intraorganizational concerns. The consequences of such redefini-
tion are not attractive. More ambiguity, not less, would result, and 
thereby lessen the value of the idea of a 'purpose' " (pp. 118-19). As 
much as O'Neill would like to wish away ambiguity, the failure of his 
categorizations to serve any useful function calls into serious doubt the 
value of his idea of a "purpose." In the final analysis, he concludes 
only that "the differing perspectives, resources and pressures among 
organizations determined the kind of decision-making process they 
were to exhibit" (p. 118). The unique characteristics of the diverse 
organizations seem to have eluded O'Neill. Nothing in the chapter 
suggests why the amicus process, in particular, would lead to any 
given type of decision-making process. 
After a brief excursion into theories of organizational behavior (pp. 
120-29), O'Neill sets out in Chapter Three to discover whether partici-
pation in the amicus process in Bakke encouraged "nourishing conflict 
and responsible participation" among members of the organizations. 
As one might expect, O'Neill finds that those organizations which en-
couraged more democratic participation among their members4 pro-
4. O'Neill characterized the organizations as democratic or oligarchic on the basis of five 
indicators: "active membership involvement before the brief was filed; encouragement of dissent-
ing opinions; alternative positions to the affirmative action issue offered; presence of an existing 
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vided better opportunity for education than those which tended 
toward a more oligarchical structure (p. 170). The chapter says very 
little, however, about any characteristics peculiar to participation in 
the amicus process that cause the process to encourage certain types of 
behavior. In fact, O'Neill suggests that participation in the amicus 
process may induce very different behavior in the same organization 
from one case to the next, depending upon a multitude of factors: 
"[O]rganizational behavior no doubt varies from issue to issue, depen-
dent on time and resources available and the nature of each contro-
versy, and including the external and internal demands and pressures 
concentrated on an organization in the context of a particular issue" 
(p. 133). Once again, the unique characteristics and necessities of the 
various organizations refuse to submit themselves to the facile analysis 
to which O'Neill tries to subject them. 
In Chapter Four, O'Neill examines the manner in which demo-
cratic organizations taught their members about participation in the 
political process. He does so by considering the degree of polarization 
and the leadership and democratic decision-making styles exhibited by 
the organizations. 5 The chapter considers such varying organizations 
as the Carter Administration, the American Jewish Congress, and the 
NAACP. As in previous chapters, the discussion does not focus on 
the role of the amicus process in determining or affecting these factors. 
O'Neill merely observes that the organizations had those various char-
acteristics and were therefore more or less successful in educating their 
memberships. In considering the crucial question of why these organi-
zations pursued the type of strategy they did, O'Neill can only con-
clude that "the evidence suggesting why some sets of leaders and 
members sought a democratic style is limited" (p. 210). 
In the fifth chapter, O'Neill finally deals with a matter that argu-
ably has some bearing on a specific characteristic of the amicus pro-
cess generating certain tendencies in organizational behavior. In this 
chapter, entitled "The Lawyer as an Organizational Leader," he con-
siders the special role of the lawyer in the amicus process. O'Neill 
contends that the presence of lawyers in the amicus process leads to 
elitist decisionmaking not conducive to education. Whether the spe-
cial role of the lawyer is peculiar to the amicus process is called into 
question by the significant role that lawyers play in all aspects of many 
membership mandate on the issue; and the emphasis placed on 'consensus' or amicable agree-
ment within the organization." P. 265. 
5. High, medium, or low scores of polarization depended upon the respondents' degree of 
agreement with the statement, "Discussion about Bakke in my organization involved name call-
ing, personal hostilities, and bitterness." Similarly, "bargaining," "compromise,'' or "integra-
tive" decision-making styles were determined by a series of questions eliciting the respondents' 
perceptions of the decision-making behavior in their organizations. Pp. 265-66. As to leadership 
style, see note 4 supra. 
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of these organizations' activities. 6 One could imagine that the lawyer's 
role in the brief-writing process is a distinct one, and that the organi-
zation's need to rely on the lawyer's technical skills in this particular 
activity may place him in greater control over the amicus process than 
over other activities. However, because O'Neill offers no empirical 
data making comparisons with the organizations' other activities, it is 
impossible to tell whether this is, in fact, the case. 
Even assuming that the lawyer's role is especially prominent in the 
amicus process and that this leads to a less effective education of the 
members of amici organizations, we return to the inevitable question 
of whether we should be terribly concerned if, in fact, the amicus pro-
cess is not an effective educational tool. After all, participation in the 
amicus process is only a small portion of these organizations' activi-
ties. 7 And, more importantly, participation in the amicus process is 
only one small way in which the courts can teach the nation. Indeed, 
O'Neill acknowledges that Bakke did give rise to an extensive national 
debate (p. 48). It is thus difficult to understand how he can conclude 
in the· final chapter that ''Bakke teaches that the court's abilities to 
instruct may be more limited than we suppose. If participants in liti-
gation rarely learn, rarely reflect on the alternatives, then the more 
passive audience of the public may never learn" (p. 255). The wander-
ing and unpersuasive analysis of O'Neill's work hardly merits such a 
bold conclusion. 
- Paul V. Timmins 
6. According to O'Neill: 
As full-time employees of an organization, lawyers have an opportunity to demonstrate their 
commitment to its goals and their loyalty to its values. The resulting greater confidence in 
the lawyer can allow him or her to play other roles for the organization: as a public rela-
tions expert; as an organizational representative before a court, a legislative committee, or 
an administrative agency hearing board; and as an "idea man" and policy researcher. 
Pp. 219-20. 
7. O'Neill found that "sixty-five percent of the 115 [organizations] contacted had partici-
pated in fewer than five court cases during the preceding ten years." P. 61. 
